Abstract-One the main objective of the European Commission is to innovate and bring ICT to its full potential in any sector, including eGovernment, eCommerce, and eHealth services. Certified Electronic Mail (CEM) systems of Member States are currently not interoperable, thus impacting on economic growth and competitiveness. The paper investigates the use of the DNSSec technology as a technological evolution of the Italian CEM System and the first step towards interoperability and adherence to international standards.
I. INTRODUCTION
The ICT agenda is one of the Europe's main priorities in order to assure a homogeneous degree of ICT penetration in all Member States, and exploit the full potential of ICT to innovate and promote economic growth and competitiveness. The Italian government established the Agency for Digital Italy (AGID) (Development Decree of June 22, 2012 [1] ) as a supervisor and coordinator of several initiatives for addressing the main challenges of the Digital Agenda for Europe (DAE), one of the seven main initiatives identified in the EU 2020 Strategy, for promoting a smart and sustainable UE. The Agency is responsible for coordinating and monitoring the progress and quality of this technological process in Italy. The Italian Posta Elettronica Certificata (PEC) is a mailbased system that offers legal evidence about sending and delivery of electronic documents; PEC implements a simple and reliable solution for the secure transmission of documents by using timestamps and receipts. AGID is the organization responsible for PEC interoperability, quality and security. The ISTI-CNR (Institute of Science and Information Technology of the National Research Council) is part of the PEC working group, and collaborates with the Agency for defining standardbased evolution of the PEC system. The paper proposes a technological evolution of the PEC system, which aims at distributing the system architecture by incorporating the use of DNSSec standard technology, improving interoperability while assuring adherence to international standards. The paper is organized in five sections: section II describes the current functional schema of the Italian PEC. Section III briefly introduces the DNSSec extensions and section IV describes the proposal in detail. Finally, section V ends the work with conclusions and future works.
II. ITALIAN CERTIFIED ELECTRONIC MAIL:
ARCHITECTURAL OVERVIEW In this section it is illustrated the architecture of the Italian PEC system [2] . The legal basis for PEC is laid down by the Presidential Decree of February 11, 2005 , Nr. 68 [3] . The decree introduces and defines the key objectives, process model, definitions and non-repudiation services of PEC. In the annex of the Decree of November 2, 2005, Nr. 266 [4] the PEC detailed technical specifications were defined.
In [5] are described a set of properties that CEM systems should satisfy. A protocol provides Non-repudiation of origin (NRO) if it offers evidence against the false denial of having originated the message and Non-repudiation of receipt (NRR) if it provides evidence against the false denial of having received the message. Moreover it provides Nonrepudiation of submission (NRS) and Non-repudiation of delivery (NRD) if it provides evidence against the false denial of having submitted or delivered the message, respectively. In a CEM protocol, Trusted Third Parties (TTPs) may be involved in addition to sender and receiver. In the case it is involved actively in each protocol step it is called inline TTP; this type of TTP usually has to process the entire message as a proxy. Instead, if it is only involved in a dispute resolution process, it is called offline TTP. Figure 1 shows the functional schema of the PEC system. The system is layered on top of the e-mail architecture based on the SMTP protocol to ensure compatibility with standard e-mail clients and to guarantee interoperability with traditional e-mail systems. Delivery agents, called PEC providers, must act as inline TTPs between senders and recipients. They have to be accredited by AGID for compliance with given technical and legal requirements, as requested in [6] . Both senders and recipients must register a mailbox with a PEC provider.
PEC providers must sign all messages and evidences according to the S/MIMEv3 standard [7] , using an Advanced Electronic Signatures (AdES) according to the EU Signature Directive [8] and the new eIDAS Regulation [9] , with an X.509v3 certificate [10] . The use of end-to-end cryptography, Fig. 1 . Functional schema of PEC e.g., using a national eID document to uniquely identify users, has several advantages such as confidentiality and sender's authentication, but implies an extensive penetration of technology in society, requiring a high degree of user technical knowledge. To mask a user from the complexity of cryptographic applications and its legal implications, it may be applied server-to-server, privileging usability against security, as is the case for PEC, assuring message integrity and NRO. Anyway, it is possible for the sender to optionally sign the original message to assure confidentiality or integrity. Now, the phases of the PEC functional protocol are described. The PEC terminology defines three main services that a provider has to implement: Access Point (AP), Reception Point (RP) and Delivery Point (DP). The AP provides Mail Transfer Agent (MTA) to forward submitted messages to other MTAs. The RP and DP can be seen as two logical units of the recipient's MTA, where the RP accepts the message from the sender's MTA and the DP stores the message into the recipient's mailbox. First of all, the sender's UA authenticates against the Sender's Access Point (S-AP). The actual PEC IETF Informational Standard [11] and the official technical rules [6] do not make any assumptions about the communication protocol between senders/recipients and providers. It defines only the minimum security requirements for authentication and confidentiality, e.g., with username/password combined with a Transport Layer Security (TLS) connection. This is an important issue in the specification of PEC that will be investigated in a future work. Then, the message is submitted to the S-AP, which performs formal validity checks on the messages and stores an NRS evidence into the sender's Message Store (MS), if they pass, or a nonacceptance evidence (negative NRS), including the reason of the failure. Then, the S-AP wraps the message in a S/MIMEv3 envelope with its X.509v3 certificate and forwards it to the Recipient's Reception Point (R-RP) using SMTP. If the R-RP does not acknowledge this message with a take-in-charge evidence within the next 12 h, the S-AP stores a non-deliveryto-RP evidence (negative NRD) into the sender's MS. If this operation was successful, the R-RP verifies the digital signature of the S-AP. If it is, R-RP returns a take-in-charge evidence to the S-RP, which is forwarded to the Sender's Delivery Point (S-DP) and stored into the sender's MS. Then, the R-RP forwards the message to the R-DP, returning a nontake-in charge evidence to the S-RP in case of an error, which is forwarded to the S-DP and stored in the sender's MS. If the R-DP operation was successful, an NRD evidence is returned by the R-DP to the S-RP and forwarded to the S-DP, which stores the message into the sender's MS. In all other cases, a non-delivery evidence (negative NRD) is returned.
Actual specifications require storing the X.509v3 certificates and the list of accredited PEC providers and domains in a centralized directory based on Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP), managed by AGID, but the access to this directory is limited to PEC providers. This mechanism is not interoperable with other CEMs, is not scalable and is based on a proprietary LDAP directory schema. As described in the ETSI REM standard specification document [12] , this file is similar to a Trust-service Status List (TSL). Its purpose is to provide a harmonized way in which assessment schemes having an oversight role with regards to trust services and their providers (TSP) can publish information about the services and TSPs which they currently oversee.
The novel idea is to distribute the TSL and the certificates using the Distributed Name System (DNS) [13] , [14] . DNS is a worldwide distributed database which associates various information with domain names. In this paper, the DNSSec extension of the DNS and a variant of the recent TLSA standard [15] , SMIMEA [16] , which are described in the next section, are used. In this way, it is possible to overcome the scalability problem, assuring public access to the TSL, and avoiding unauthorized modifications to it, increasing interoperability between different CEMs.
III. DNS SECURITY EXTENSION
DNSSec [17] - [19] is an extension of the DNS that provides authentication, integrity and denial of existence of data, but not availability or confidentiality. DNSSec is perfectly backward compatible with DNS and it inherits the same hierarchy, so that a DNSSec server can resolve a DNS query and viceversa. DNSSec defines a public key infrastructure over DNS tree hierarchy in such a way that a parent zone authenticates public keys of its child zones. For this purpose it adds new Resource Records(RR): (1) the RRSIG RR, which contains a digital signature to authenticate a set of RRs, (2) the DNSKEY RR, which contains the public key used to verify RRSIG's record signature, (3) the DS RR, which contains the hash of the public key of the delegated zone signed by the private key of the parent zone and (4) the NSEC RR, which contains a link of the following domain name in the zone to authenticate the denial of existence. To prove that a DNS answer is correct, at least one public key is needed, called a trust anchor, which is typically obtained with the operating system or some other trusted sources outside the DNS. A Trust Authentication Chain is a chain composed by a series of linked DS and DNSKEY RRs, starting with a trust anchor to the authoritative name server for the queried domain, which can be securely authenticated entirely. All answers from DNSSec zones are signed by one or more RRSIG RRs, in addition to the record type that was requested, to check that the information was not altered. The signature contained in the RRSIG RR is verified by a DNSSec resolver, locating the correct public key found in a DNSKEY RR, which is authenticated by a DS RR of the parent zone or a trust anchor.
The DANE IETF working group aims to develop protocols and techniques to establish cryptographically secure communications based on DNSSec, to replace the traditional model based on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [10] . With RFC6698 [15] DANE specifies a new RR, called TLSA, to embed in an authoritative DNSSec zone the authentication informations of an X.509v3 certificate, to provide an alternative way to retrieve public keys to be used with Transport Layer Security (TLS) based communications.
The public CA model based on PKI is fundamentally vulnerable for various reasons. First of all, a single trusted CA that betrays its trusts can undermine the security offered by any certificates it issues. Furthermore, trusting a large number of CAs might be a problem because any breached CA could issue a certificate based on a compromised key for any domain name. The new DANE model based on DNSSec and the new TLSA RR provides three significant improvements:
1) The TLSA RR links the X.509v3 certificate or public key with its domain name, thus forming a TLSA certificate association, instead of arbitrarily identifying strings. 2) certificates or public keys for any domain are accessible online through a simple query using the standard DNSSec protocol, resolving the problem of distribution. 3) certificates or public keys associated with a domain name can only be signed by a key associated with the parent of that domain name. This prevents an untrustworthy signer from compromising anyone's keys except those in their own subdomains. Additionally DANE allows a domain owner to specify which CA is allowed to issue certificates for a particular resource, which solves the problem of any CA being able to issue certificates for any domain. As a result, DANE embodies the security "principle of least privilege" that is lacking in the current public CA model.
The following is an example of a TLSA RR:
In the following, the various parameters of the TLSA RR type are briefly analyzed:
• The first parameter, the domain name, works as a selector to choose the right certificate for a given service. It is the concatenation of three character strings, separated by a dot:
1) the first string (e.g., 443) is the decimal representation of the UDP/TCP port number of the service waiting for connections, prepended with an underscore ' ' character. 2) the second string (e.g., tcp) is the name of the transport protocol, such as "udp" or "tcp", prepended with an underscore ' ' character. 3) the third string (e.g., www.example.com) is the fully qualified domain name [14] of the host where the service is deployed.
• The second parameter is the certificate usage field (e.g.
PKIX-TA(0)).
The standard defines 4 values: 1) PKIX-TA(0): It is used to specify a CA certificate that must be found in any of the PKIX certification paths for the end entity certificate given by the host where the service is deployed. 2) PKIX-EE(1): It is used to specify an end entity certificate of the host where the service is deployed. The certificate must pass PKIX certification path validation. 3) DANE-TA(2): It is used to specify a certificate that must be used as the trust anchor when validating the end entity certificate given by the host where the service is deployed.
4) DANE-EE(3):
It is used to specify an end entity certificate of the host where the service is deployed, avoiding PKIX validation, allowing for an administrator to issue certificates for a domain without involving a CA.
• The third parameter is the certificate selector field. It represents what parts of the certificate are specified by the association data. The standard defines 2 values: 1) Full(0): used to specify that the entire certificate is encoded in the association data [10] . 2) SPKI(1): used to specify that only the SubjectPublicKeyInfo (SPKI) part of the certificate is encoded in the association data [10] . It is useful to reduce the size of the RR, especially combined with the selector DANE-EE(3).
• The fourth parameter is the matching type field. It specifies how the certificate association is presented. The standard defines 3 values: 1) Full(0): used to specify that the association data represents exactly the SPKI part or the full certificate. 2) SHA2-256(1), SHA2-512(2): It is used to specify that the association data is the SHA2-256 or SHA2-512 hash of the SPKI part or the full certificate.
• The fourth and last parameter is the association data, which represents the DER hexadecimal representation of the SPKI part, the full certificate, or a hash of it. In particular, in the paper the DANE-EE(3) selector is used, to allow a PEC provider to manage its own certificates; actually, AGID acts as a CA for the issue and revocation of X509v3 certificates of the PEC providers: using TLSA, it can delegate the responsibility directly to PEC providers without reducing security. PEC providers can also substitute or revoke certificates expired or with compromised public keys and can also decide autonomously how and when to perform their rollover, using the procedure described in paragraph 8.1 of a recent draft of the IETF DANE group [20] . Since the binding of the certificate to its name is based entirely on the TLSA record association, all the fields in the certificate related to the CA or the entity to be certified must be ignored by the DNSSec resolver. Furthermore, the expiration date of the certificate must also be ignored: the validity period of the TLSA record binding is determined by the validity interval of the TLSA record DNSSec signature, reported in the RRSIG RR, avoiding the problem of managing a separated Certificate Revocation List (CRL); in fact, to revoke a certificate or a public key is enough to cancel the related TLSA RR.
In the paper, the more recent and specialized SMIMEA RR is used, which has been introduced in a recent draft of the IETF DANE group [16] . The SMIMEA RR is used to associate a certificate with an email address, thus forming a "SMIMEA certificate association", to authenticate an S/MIMEv3 [7] envelope. The SMIMEA wire format and presentation format are the same as that of the TLSA record. The semantics is also the same for every field, except that RFC6698 talks about the TLS protocol only. The main difference is in the composition of the domain name, which is based on the user's email address, and is the concatenation of the hashed hexadecimal representation of the user name (the left-hand side of the email address, without the "@" symbol), the predefined fixed string " smimecert" and the email domain name (the righthand side of the email address), separated by a dot.
The wildcard "*" could be used to indicate that a certificate or a public key is used to authenticate every email received from a specific domain. In the next section, a PEC evolution has been introduced, paying attention to minimizing the changes needed to the actual specifications.
IV. EVOLUTION OF THE ITALIAN PEC
In this section, it is introduced an evolution of PEC technical specifications to increase standardization, interoperability and scalability of the actual solution; to explain how the new specifications work, a case study is illustrated in section IV-A, with all entities involved in a typical PEC infrastructure.
A. A Case study
In this section, it is introduced a case study to simplify the explanation of the proposed evolution of the PEC standard. There are some entities that are involved in the PEC infrastructure. For the case study, five entities have been introduced, with three different roles:
• AGID: as explained in section I, it is the government Agency authorized to monitor the conformance of the activity of the PEC providers to the PEC technical rules. In particular, it has the responsibility to manage the TSL of accredited PEC providers.
• Pec1, Pec2: they represent two PEC providers; they have the responsibility of handling one or more PEC domains with their relative points of Access, Reception, and Delivery. Technically, they are the owners of keys that are used for signing PEC notifications and envelopes and manage the TSL of accredited PEC domains.
• PD1, PD2: they represent two PEC domain owners. They are the administrative entities that have the responsibility of managing the mailboxes of end users and relative PEC email domains. PD1 and PD2 domains are managed by Pec1 and Pec2 PEC providers respectively.
To distribute responsibility and to increase scalability, the new specifications required that AGID and each PEC provider and domain must create and manage their own authoritative DNS zones; DNSSec is mandatory only for AGID and PEC providers, while it is only optional for PEC domains, due to the technological competences and economical costs needed to maintain a signed zone. In these zones are published a set of RRs needed to maintain the TSL of accredited PEC providers and domains, plus the SMIMEA RR which embeds the public key needed to verify signed S/MIMEv3 envelopes and evidences, as described in the next section IV-B. These zones must be devoted exclusively to PEC, to avoid ambiguities with RRs with the same domain name used for different purposes. For AGID, the domain name of the DNSSec zone must be the well-known name agid.it, while for PEC providers and domains it is calculated differently; for PEC domains, it must be exactly the PEC fully qualified email domain name, e.g., PD1.it and PD2.it in the case study, while for PEC providers it is the PEC email domain name of the service mailbox used to send and receive evidence and S/MIMEv3 envelopes, as described in section 2.1 of RFC6109 [11] : in this way, it is possible to identify directly the DNS zone to be queried by inspecting the S/MIMEv3 header of the sent or received PEC envelopes or evidence. In the case study, the names of these zones are Pec1.it and Pec2.it respectively. Figures 2, 3 and 4 show the relevant parts of the master files of the DNS zones of AGID, Pec1 and PD1, respectively.
B. Architecture of the proposed evolution
In this section, the logical architecture of the proposed evolution of the Italian PEC is described, extending a proposal shown in [21] . First of all, we solve the problem of the publication and distribution of the X.509v3 certificates used by the PEC providers to authenticate the origin and integrity of PEC evidences and envelopes. The proposed method is based on the publication of one or more SMIMEA RR embedding the above mentioned certificates, as illustrated in section III, in the DNSSec zone managed by every PEC provider; the parameters of the RR must be the following: 1) the domain name is a concatenation of the wildcard "*" with the predefined string " smimecert" and the domain name of the service mailbox; the wildcard is needed to specify that the RR must be used to authenticate every PEC envelopes sent by the PEC providers on behalf of end users, using the service mailbox.
2) the certificate usage must be DANE-EE(3), to allow a PEC provider to manage autonomously their certificates and public keys, without involving a CA. 3) the selector must be SPKI(1), to reduce the size of the RR by avoiding the unuseful parts of the complete certificate, such as the name and datas of the CA and the certified entity. 4) the selecting type must be Full(0), to eliminate the X.509v3 certificate added to the PEC transport envelope, as specified in the RFC6109 [11] , giving the priority to the SMIMEA RR; the presence of the above mentioned certificate is left optional, to reduce the size of the message on the network. Figure 3 shows an SMIMEA RR, which embeds the SPKI part of the X.509v3 certificate of Pec1. The ways to execute the rollover, the revocation and the publication of one or more certificates embedded in a SMIMEA RR are described in section III. In particular, it is recommended to set to a maximum of 24 hours the TTL of the signature record of the SMIMEA RR or of the NSEC RR that substitute it, to reduce the time discrepancy due to the resolver's caching. Now, it is illustrated how to solve the problem of the publication of the TSL of accredited PEC providers and domains, using DNS. In the beginning, it has been analysed a simple centralized method, where AGID managed the list of PEC providers and domains directly in its DNSSec zone, using a set of particular TXT RRs; the domain name of each TXT RR was the concatenation of the PEC provider or domain's fully qualified domain name and AGID's fully qualified domain name, e.g., pec1.it.agid.it; if it was present and validated, the corresponding PEC provider or domain was accredited, otherwise, if an NSEC record was retrieved and validated, the PEC provider or domain was not accredited. This method allowed AGID to manage the TLS in a simple, fast and reliable way, but it was not scalable with the number of PEC providers and domains and was not efficient, since it required synchronization between AGID and PEC providers to keep the lists updated.
The distributed method is based on delegation, exploiting public key cryptography: every accredited PEC provider must publish a particular TXT RR, which contains a unique digital signature created by AGID. AGID must advertise the public key to validate the above TXT RR in its DNSSec zone, embedded in a particular TXT RR instead of a TLSA RR, since the TLSA standard does not allow other use cases. A PEC provider manages the TLS of its accredited PEC domains into a similar way, taking in considerations some further problematics, such as that the DNS zones of the PEC domains are, in most cases, insecure. The syntax of the TXT RR is a set of tag=value pairs, separated by semicolons, similar to the well known IETF DomainKeys Identified Mail system [22] . For our purposes, we have defined the following parameters:
• v=pec2: it is the version tag, fixed actually to the predefined value pec2; every TXT RR used for PEC must insert it as first parameter.
• sig=xxx: it is the signature tag, created by the authorizer, in DER hexadecimal representation.
• pkey=xxx: it is the DER hexadecimal representation of the SPKI part of the X.509v3 certificate which embed the public key published by the authorizer. It is needed to validate the signature sig parameter. The TXT RR of an accredited PEC provider is well-formed if it contains only the v and sig tags; its domain name is the fully qualified domain name of the DNS zone of the PEC provider, the TXT RR with the domain name pec1.it, shown in figure 3 of the case study. The TXT RR which embeds the public key of the authorizer is well-formed if it contains only the v and pkey tags; its domain name must be included in the reserved domain space " pec." in the DNS zone of the authorizer, the TXT RR with the domain name pec.agid.it, shown in figure 2 of the case study. To calculate a unique signature, AGID must apply a canonicalization algorithm, concatenating the v tag with the PEC provider DNS zone's fully qualified domain name, separated by a semicolon, without introducing spaces, in strict order; in the case study, to add the new accredited PEC provider, Pec1, AGID must create and encode the string v=pec2;pec1.it, and must send to Pec1 the resulting TXT RR, shown in figure 3 . Pec1 starts to be accredited immediately after the publication of the TXT RR in its DNS zone.
To revoke authorization to an accredited PEC provider or domain, a method similar to the one used by a CA for the management of a CRL [23] is used: AGID or a PEC provider could manage a single key pair, maintaining a revocation list of PEC providers and domains in their DNS zones. The list is composed of a set of TXT RRs, each of which is related to a single PEC provider or domain: the TXT RR is wellformed if it contains only the v tag, and its domain name is the fully qualified name of the revoked PEC provider or domain's DNS zone, which acts as a selector; for example, figure 2 shows a TXT RR used to revoke Pec1, with the domain name pec1.it.agid.it. When the authorizer performs a rollover of the TXT RR that contains the public key, it must remove all the TXT RRs belonged to the revocation list, minimizing the number of RRs in its DNS zone; in fact, after the change of the key pair, the sig tag of the TXT RR published in the DNS zone of the revoked PEC provider or domain could not be verified anymore. For the authorizer, it is enough to add this TXT RR to its DNS zone to revoke a particular PEC provider or domain; in fact, a PEC provider or domain is revoked if and only if (1) the TXT RR which contains the sig tag has been removed by the DNS zone of the PEC provider or domain, or (2) the TXT RR mentioned in point 1 has not been removed, but the sig tag could not be authenticated by the public key of the authorizer, or (3) the TXT RR mentioned in point 1 has not been removed, the sig tag is authenticated by the public key of the authorizer but the PEC provider or domain is present in the revocation list of the authorizer.
To authorize a PEC domain, there is a further problem to resolve: the above mentioned TXT RR containing the sig tag is enough to solve the problem of an insecure DNS zone, since the signature protects against Man in the Middle (MITM) attacks and ensures the origin and integrity of data, but it is not enough to resolve the problem that a PEC domain is authorized by two different accredited PEC providers, which is not admissible for the current PEC regulations: every PEC domain must be managed by a unique PEC provider, so it could be quickly identifiable for a possible dispute resolution process. The problematic could arise during the migration operation of a PEC domain from an accredited PEC provider to another, due to errors or malicious behaviours of one of the PEC providers or the PEC domain. To solve this problem, two further parameters have been defined:
• ppd=xxx: the accredited PEC provider name tag; it contains the fully qualified name of the DNSSec zone of the accredited PEC provider authorized to manage the PEC domain.
• d=01011900: the data creation tag of the TXT RR; the format is its numerical ddmmaaaa (day, month, year) representation without spaces.
The TXT RR of an accredited PEC domain is well-formed if it contains only the v, ppd, d and sig tag. To calculate the sig tag, the PEC provider must use a canonicalization algorithm similar to the one used by AGID, concatenating the v, ppd and d tags separated by semicolon, without introducing spaces, in strictly order; to add the new accredited PEC domain PD1, Pec1 must create and encode the string v=pec2;ppd=pec1.it;d=01012015 with its private key and send to PD1 the new TXT RR shown in figure 4 . To understand the reasons for the introduction of the new tags and when the above mentioned problematic arises, in the following will be explained how the migration process is performed; for example, supposing that the PD1 domain chooses to migrate from the Pec1 provider to the Pec2 provider, the steps performed by the various actors must be the following: 1) PD1 must communicate to Pec1 the intention to perform a migration to Pec2 and, in the same way, must communicate to Pec2 the intention to be managed from its PEC framework, waiting for a new TXT RR created by Pec2 to be authorized. Optionally it can eliminate from its DNS zone the old TXT RR signed and received by Pec1. 2) Pec1 must publish the TXT RR needed to insert PD1 in its revocation list, as shown in figure 3 . 3) Pec2, before creating the new signed TXT RR for PD1, must check, using a DNS query, if Pec1 published the TXT RR related to PD1 in its revocation list, or, alternatively, if PD1 eliminated the old TXT RR signed and received by the Pec1 provider from its own DNS zone; this operation is needed to ensure that PD1 has been revoked by the old PEC provider. 4) When the condition in point 2 is accomplished, Pec2 can create the new signed TXT RR and send it to PD1, using any type of communication channel; a possible MITM attack is easily detectable by verifying the sig tag. 5) After received the new signed TXT RR, PD1 must publish it in its DNS zone and then can start to act as an authorized PEC domain managed by Pec2. In the case study, the problem arises in the case of PD1 advertises both the signed TXT RR of Pec1 and Pec2, Pec1 does not insert it in its revocation list, maliciously or by error, and Pec2 does not perform the operations explained in the above point 2, releasing the signed TXT RR too early. Instead, if Pec2 correctly performs the operations of point 2, the problem does not arise, but a period of unavailability of the PEC service for PD1 is introduced, damaging end users. The temporary unavailability period is due to the fact that a third PEC provider sending or receiving a PEC envelope from the PEC domain, could not decide what is the right PEC provider, so to be safe against malicious non-authorized PEC providers or domains, it must consider the PEC domain as a standard email domain. Using the d tag, it can safely choose the most recent verified TXT RR, (e.g., Pec2) avoiding the unavailability period, changing the operations performed in point 2: in the new specifications, Pec1 must wait for PD1 publishing the new TXT RR signed by Pec2.
The rollover of a TXT RR which contains a pkey tag is performed in the same way as the SMIMEA RR, but every authorizer must recreate and send all the TXT RRs to accredited PEC providers and domains: it could be a long and expensive operation for a large PEC provider's organization with thousands managed PEC domains, so it must be performed seldom, e.g. once a year or when the private key has been compromised. Every accredited PEC provider or domain must advertise the new TXT RR in its DNS zone before the expiration of the old public key of the authorizer. Figure IV -B shows the flow of a PEC message from a Sender to a Receipt, limited to the modifications involved by the new proposal. S-DNS and R-DNS are the DNSSec zones of the Sender and Receipt's PEC providers, respectively: it is possible to note that changes are restricted to the operation performed by S-AP and R-AP, substituting the access to the centralized LDAP directory with a set of DNS queries. In the last part of this section, the algorithm performed by the S-AP during the delivery of a PEC message received from the Sender is explained in detail; it is very similar to the algorithm performed by the R-RP, with some differences explained at the end of the section. In the case study, it is supposed that the Sender owns the mailbox Sender@PD2.it and sends a PEC message to the Recipient, which owns the .it, so S-AP is the Pec2's Access Point, while R-RP is the Pec1's Reception Point. As explained in section 2.1.1 of RFC7672 [24] , every "insecure", "bogus" or "indeterminate" answer to a secure query returned by a security-aware DNS resolver is treated as a lookup failure, except for the answer to an insecure query, e.g., queries sent to the PEC domains' DNS zones. Due to the fact that the lookup failure could be transient (network errors, DNS request timeout, etc...) or persistent (expiration of a DNSSec key or signature, loss of a thrust anchor, absence of a requested RR, etc.), a lookup timeout has been added to the algorithm: if the Sender's PEC provider is not able to identify without any doubt that the Receipt's PEC provider and domain are accredited until timeout is expired, to be safe against malicious or false PEC providers or domains, it must consider the PEC domain as not accredited, treating it as a standard email domain.
With these assumptions, S-AP performs the following steps: 1) After the formal checks required by PEC technical specifications in section 2.2.1 of RFC6109 [11] , it must extract the fully qualified domain name of the Receipt's PEC domain from the SMIMEv3 header of the Sender's message, e.g. PD1.it in the case study. Then, it must submit a DNS query with type TXT and domain name PD1.it, to retrieve the TXT RR needed to authenticate PD1. The lookup timeout must begin immediately before the DNS query submission. 2) If one or more well-formed TXT RRs are retrieved, it must verify the sig tag value of the most recent one, on the basis of the d tag values. In our case study, it retrieves the unique TXT RR shown in figure 4 . It is possible to note that multiple TXT RRs with the same ppd and d tag values are retrieved in case of the rollover of the public key is performed. 3) It must submit a secure DNS query with type TXT and domain name equal to the ppd tag value, to the reserved domain space " pec.", e.g. pec.pec1.it in the case study, in order to retrieve the public key and cryptographic algorithm needed to authenticate the TXT RRs of the PEC domain. 4) If the query in point 3 retrieves one or more well-formed secured TXT RRs, it must extract their pkey tag values: they represent the SPKI part of one or more X.509v3 certificates. It is possible to note that multiple TXT RRs are retrieved in case of the rollover of the public key is performed. 5) Before to verify the sig tag value of the most recent well-formed TXT RRs retrieved in point 2, it must check whether the related PEC provider, indicated by the ppd tag value, is accredited; the steps performed are similar and simpler than the ones described here, so it will not been explained due to lack of space. 6) If the PEC provider is accredited, it must verify the sig tag value, applying the canonicalization algorithm. 7) If the sig tag value has been verified with success, it must check whether the PEC domain has not been revoked by its PEC provider and inserted in its revocation list. To perform this check, it must submit a secure DNS query with type TXT and domain name pd1.it.pec1.it, in the case study. 8) If the query in point 7 retrieves a secured and validated denial of existence (NSEC record), the PEC provider and domain must be declared accredited and Pec1 stops the lookout timeout.
If (1) a lookup failure of a DNS query occurred or (2) all the retrieved TXT RRs are not well-formed in points 2 or 4, or (3) the verification operation in point 7 has not succeeded or (4) a well-formed TXT RR is retrieved from the query in point 7 or (5) the PEC provider is not accredited by AGID, then the PEC domain must be declared not accredited, to be safe against malicious or false PEC providers or domains and against possible Internet attacks, only after the expiration of the lookup timeout. Before the timeout expiration, the Sender's PEC provider can freely employ any policy to try to identify correctly the Receipt's PEC provider or domain, e.g., repeating one or more DNS queries. According to the result of the check, the message is sent as a PEC message or as a standard email message, following the procedures described in section II and in the actual PEC technical rules, without further changes.
On the other hand, the R-RP that receives a PEC envelope, after the steps mentioned above, must perform the following steps to retrieve the public key of the Sender's PEC provider needed to authenticate it:
• It must submit a secure DNS query with type SMIMEA and domain name calculated as described in this section; in the case study, it is *. smimecert.pec1.it.
• If the query in point 1 retrieves one or more secured SMIMEA RR, it must extract from them the public keys and cryptographic algorithms. It is possible to note that multiple SMIMEA RRs are retrieved in case of the rollover of the public key is performed. If a lookup failure of the DNS query occurred, the PEC envelope must be treated as not authenticated. According to the result of the verification, R-RP must follow the procedures described in section II and in the actual PEC technical rules, without further changes. In this paper, an evolution of the Italian PEC has been proposed, with the purpose to increase its standardization, interoperability and scalability. To obtain this result, firstly some bottlenecks of the actual solution has been identified : in particular, the use of a centralized LDAP directory, based on a proprietary schema, for access to the TSLs of accredited PEC providers and domains and their X.509v3 certificates. In the proposal, the DNSSec extension of the DNS and the SMIMEA RR has been exploited, guaranteeing the benefits described in Section III and assuring public access to the TLS avoiding unauthorized modifications to it, increasing interoperability between different CEMs and increasing scalability in terms of the number of managed PEC providers and domains: in fact, the legal and technical responsibilities of the management of certificates and TSL of the PEC domains are delegated to PEC providers, reducing AGID involvement in the functional mechanisms of PEC. The above mentioned benefits are compensated for the increased complexity and network traffic of the new solution, but these drawbacks are mostly concentrated in AGID and PEC providers, which, to be accredited, must reach technical skills and economic requirements, established by law, to assure an adequate service level. Furthermore, the proposal does not impact substantially on current Italian legislation, requiring only a change in the technical rules that are annexes of the law, maintaining the same current security level but moving from PKI to the DNSSec hierarchy with great advantages in term of costs reduction.
As future work, the changes to the actual PEC technical specifications will be completed, developing a complete set of functional tests to validate the practical application of the new proposal. Furthermore, the introduction of Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [25] as an authentication mechanism to authorize and uniquely identify PEC end-users will be investigated, to fill the gap in the PEC technical rules, and to achieve a better compliance with eIDAS requirements.
